Blood and Oil Essay

How to explain the post-Cold War violence? Some attribute it to identity politics (xi-xii). Pace Samuel Huntington, the cause is a struggle for resources (xii). Oil as special resource: 2001 and since revelatory of the consequences of oil dependency (xiii-xv). Goal of book: â€Å"Tracing the evolution of U.S. oil policy and weighing its consequences for the future† (xvi). Ch. 1: The Dependency Dilemma: Imported Oil and National Security. Cento (1-4). Military sees it as an extension of the 1980 Carter Doctrine (5-6).Similar development elsewhere of military as â€Å"global oil-protection service† (6-7). Oil asked to U.S. economic and military strength (7-10). â€Å"Oil makes this country strong; dependency makes us weak† (11). U.S. policy has been to â€Å"securitize† oil (12).Dependency on imported oil surpassed 50%in April 1998 (13). Late 1990s policy debate (14). George W. Bush acknowledges problem but does not really counter dependency with policies (15). â€Å"Dependency is not a static condition†. (15) Forecasts of growing dependency thro ugh 2025 (17-18). Table of proven reserves (19). Reserves in volatile regions (18, 20-21). U.S. presence in these regions and the nature of the oil industry are inherently destabilizing (21-22). Competition (or demand) for oil is increasing (22-23).Result: global economic instability (23).Ineffectiveness of military strategy, which has serious unintended consequences (24-26). Ch. 2: Lethal Embrace: The American Alliance with Saudi Arabia. Importance of â€Å"U.S.-Saudi relationship† (26-27). Anxiety about oil supplies in early 1940s led to decision in favor of â€Å"substantial and orderly expansion of production in Eastern Hemisphere sources of supply, principally the Middle East† (April 1944, â€Å"Foreign Petroleum Policy of the United States†) (28-30). SOCAL creates CASOC and finds oil, 1938 (31).Recognition of importance leads Roosevelt to extend Lend-Lease to Saudi Arabia, 1943(32-33). U.S. govt. tries to set up the Petroleum Reserves Corp. to buy CASOC’sconcession, 1943 ― but resistance keeps it from being realized (34-35). A â€Å"public-private partnership† (David Painter, Oil and the American Century [1986]) characterizesU.S. Involvement in development of Persian Gulf oil (35). Roosevelt and In Saud forge alliance, Feb. 14, 1945 (35-37). U.S.commitment to defend Saudi oil fields and the Saudi government ― and other Persian Gulf oil sources ― â€Å"a major theme of cold-war history† (37-38). Iran crisis of 1946 and concern for Mideast oil: need to overcome domestic resistance to overseas commitments led to â€Å"apocalyptic terms† of the Truman Doctrine (39-41). U.S. helps create modern Saudi army and air force, 1949-early 1950s (40). Eisenhower Doctrine (Jan. 5, 1957) designed to bolster pro-American regimes in the context of Nasser’s flirtation with the Soviet Union (41-42).Vietnam War forced proxy-based Nixon Doctrine (July 1969); Saudi Arabia and Iran are proxies of choice (42-43). But it inspired domestic opposition and leads to Shah’s overthrow in 1979 (44-45). Hostage drama and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan lead to Carter Doctrine (Jan. 23, 1980): the U.S. will protect Persian Gulf oil â€Å"by any means necessary† (45-46). Creation of Central Command (46-47). Consequences of the Carter Doctrine: huge arms sales to Saudi Arabia (47-48), tilting toward Iraq in Iran-Iraq war (48-49), ousting Iraq from Kuwait (49-50). Aug. 6, 1990 Cheney-King Fahd meeting leads to Operation Desert Shield (51-52).Desert Storm (52-53). Containment of Iraq: No-fly zones, $40b in arms to Saudi Arabia (53). 9/11 attacks and Osama bin Laden’s hostility â€Å"provoked primarily by the deployment of American troops in Saudi Arabia and the continuing alliance between Washington and the Saudi royal family, â€Å"which was â€Å"a product of America’s thirst for imported oil and the monarchy’s hunger for protection† (54-55). Ch. 3: Choosing Dependency: The Energy Strategy of the Bush Administration. Bush administration’s May 17, 2001 National Energy Policy (â€Å"The Cheney report†) (Feigns commitment to energy independence (56-59). But Ch. 8reveals immensity of growing dependency on imported oil in a chart and calls on the president to â€Å"make our energy security apriority in our trade and foreign policy† (61-64). Hopes for source diversification (Latin America, Caspian Basin, and West Africa) â€Å"face high risk of supply disruptions and shutdowns† (64-66). Defense Planning Guidance of 1992 and the Project for a New American Century highlight military (67-69).George W. Bush’s Sept. 24, 1999 Citadel speech called for greater power-projection capabilities (69-70). A Feb. 3, 2001 secrets document aims at assessing military implications of the energy plan (70-71). These 30, 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review emphasizes power projection (71-72). Warn terror morphing into energy supplyprotection: â€Å"It appears that theadministration has merged its three mainforeign-policy and security policies(increased access to overseas oil, enhancedpower-projection capabilities, and intensifiedanti-terror operations) into a single, unified plan† (72-73). Ch. 4: Trapped in the Gulf: TheIrresistible Lure of Bountiful Petroleum. The Cheney report â€Å"committed the UnitedStates to perpetual dependence on PersianGulf oil† (74-78). U.S. strategy aims atraising Persian Gulf oil production â€Å"from 24.0million barrels per day in 1999 to 44.5 millionbarrels in 2020 † (79). Obstacles: economic,technological, political, and military (79-82).Strands of U.S. policy constitute a â€Å"strategyof maximum extraction† (82-84). Primaryimportance of Saudi Arabia led some toadvocate in 2002 for seizure of Saudi oilfields (84-86). Social, economic, political,and religious sources of Saudi instability (86-89). U.S. approach is to strengthen Saudiroyal family and encourage reform (89-90).Iraq war as a way of being able to withdrawU.S. troops from Saudi Arabia (90).Palestinian statehood also backed for thisreason (91). Likewise. calls for reform andfighting terrorism in Saudi Arabia (91-93).Overthrow of Saddam Hussein needed bothto foster Gulf stability and to boost Iraqiproduction (94-105). Iran’s policies are inopposition to U.S. plans in the Persian Gulf,and sanctions are an inadequate weaponbecause they impede development of petroleum resources (105-07). Iran also hasthe power to disrupt energy supplies byblocking the Strait of Hormuz (107-08). Forthe time being the â€Å"dual-track policy† of Zalmay Khalilzad, consisting of denouncingIran’s government while encouragingopponents of the regime is being followed,but more aggressive policies are beingconsidered (108-10). Gulf problems willcontinue to require U.S. troops: â€Å"No matterhow costly the effort grows, we cannotremove our forces from the Gulf as long aswe remain committed to a strategy of maximum petroleum extraction. To meetanticipated U.S. energy demand in the yearsahead while also slaking the thirst of otheroil-importing nations, the Gulf producersmust . . . boost their combined oil output by85 percent between now and 2020, andthese supplies must safely reach theirmarkets† (111-12). Ch. 5: No Safe Havens: Oil and Conflictbeyond the Persian Gulf.